Arbitration Between U.S. and West German Companies: An Example of Effective Dispute Resolution in International Business Transactions by Sandrock, Otto
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1. INTRODUCTION
Hundreds, if not thousands of major business contracts are signed
by U.S. and West German companies each year. In most of these trans-
actions, notably long-term performance contracts, the parties perceive
the need to deal with potential future disputes and include an appropri-
ate clause in the contract which provides for a mechanism to solve such
disputes effectively.
1.1. The Primary Question: Conciliation or Arbitration?
Two kinds of formal, regulated procedures are at the disposal of
the parties to such a contract: the rules on international conciliation1
and the rules on international arbitration. In practical importance, at
the level of large international transactions, the rules on arbitration far
exceed those on conciliation. According to figures published by the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, 339 requests for
arbitration were registered in 1985 by the Secretariat of its Court of
Arbitration, whereas, in that same year, only a very few requests for
* Revised edition of a paper presented, under the former title of "Dispute
Resolution in International Business Transactions," to the Conference on International
Law and the Future World Order, held in honor of the late Professor A.J. Thomas,
Jr., by the Law School of the Southern Methodist University on March 22-23, 1984,
Dallas, Texas.
** LL.D. (University of Gbittingen, West Germany), LL.M. (Yale), Professor at
the Law School of Muenster, Federal Republic of Germany. The author is indebted to
Dr. Werner F. Ebke, visiting professor at the School of Law, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity, Dallas, Texas, to Paul Garner, LL.M. 1984, School of Law, Southern Meth-
odist University, and to Andrew Kent, J.D. candidate, 1987, University of Pennsylva-
nia Law School, for their editorial assistance.
' For example, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris has es-
tablished its Optional Conciliation Rules. They appear in INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE, RULES FOR THE ICC COURT OF ARBITRATION, at 7 ( ICC Pub. No.
291, 1980). The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCI-
TRAL) has drafted its own conciliation rules which were adopted by the 35th General
Assembly of the United Nations on Dec. 4, 1980. See Conciliation Rules of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/52 (1980),
reprinted in [1980] 11 UNCITRAL Y.B. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1980.
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conciliation were filed.2 Similar results are obtained if one looks at the
figures published by the International Center for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) in Washington, D.C.,' another important in-
ternational institution entrusted with the conciliation and arbitration of
business disputes. During the period from 1971 through June 30, 1985,
twenty requests for arbitration proceedings and only two for concilia-
tion were registered by its Secretary General."
Private international business arbitration thus seems to be a means
of dispute resolution unparalleled in practical importance by any other
procedural tool. Yearly statistics from the Court of Arbitration of the
ICC illustrate this very encouraging development.' In 1946, four dis-
putes were submitted to its Court of Arbitration. In 1956 this number
increased to 32 disputes and in 1969 to 130 disputes. During the period
1970 through 1976, the annual average number of newly listed disputes
was 170. This annual average increased again, to 250, during the pe-
riod 1977 through 1982. In 1985, new cases exceeded 300 for the first
time. This general experience on a large international scale is also of
importance for special U.S.-West German trade relationships. It cannot
be disputed that arbitration, if properly provided for in the contract, is
the most effective means of dispute resolution between U.S. and West
German business enterprises.
Before examining the manner by which arbitration may be organ-
ized most effectively, three international treaties with potentially signif-
icant impact upon such arbitration will be generally reviewed. A more
detailed examination will follow later in this article.'
2 1985 ICC ANNUAL REPORT 21 (ICC Pub. No. 437, 1986).
See generally Broches, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, in HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 1 (1977).
' For a summary of all cases filed prior to June 30, 1981, see ICSID, FIFTEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT 30 (1981). Each annual report since 1981 lists those new cases filed
during that year.
5 See 1985 ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5; see also de Hancock, The
ICC Court of Arbitration: The Institution and its Procedures, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 21, 22
(1984).
' See infra notes 22-69, 145-93 and accompanying text.
As to the subject of the present article, see generally Glossner, Law and Institu-
tions of Arbitration in the Federal Republic of Germany and their Relevance for
American - West German Business Relations, in SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT IM
DEUTSCH -AMERIKANISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSVERKEHR (Arbitration in U.S.-West Ger-
man Business Relations) 27 (K. Bockstiegel ed. 1985); Hoellering, The Law of Arbitra-
tion in the United States and its Relevance for German-American Business Relations,
in SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT IM DEUTSCH-AMERIKANISCHEN WIRTSCHAFT-
SVERKEHR, supra, at 11.
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1.2. The Impact of Three International Treaties
The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are
bound, in matters of private arbitration, by one bilateral and two multi-
lateral international treaties: the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation of October 29, 1954 (Treaty of Friendship);7 the
multilateral Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States of March 18, 1965 (ICSID
Convention);" and the multilateral New York Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10,
1958 (New York Convention). 9
The Treaty of Friendship provides in article VI, paragraph 2 that
[c]ontracts entered into between nationals or companies of ei-
ther Party and nationals or companies of the other Party,
that provide for the settlement by arbitration of controversies
shall not be deemed unenforceable within the territories of
such other Party merely on the grounds that the place desig-
nated for the arbitration proceedings is outside such territo-
ries or that the nationality of one or more of the arbitrators
is not that of such other Party. Awards duly rendered pursu-
ant to any such contracts, which are final and enforceable
under the laws of the place where rendered, shall be deemed
conclusive in enforcement proceedings brought before the
courts of competent jurisdiction of either Party, and shall be
entitled to be declared enforceable by such courts, except
where found contrary to public policy.10
Though this paragraph deals with only two problems of limited pur-
view, its practical importance should not be underestimated."
This approach is different than that of the ICSID Convention.
The ICSID has been viewed, by the authors of the ICSID Convention,
as an institution to deal with disputes between companies from indus-
trialized countries and those from developing states, rather than as an
7 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-
West Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
8 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, opened for signature, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S.
No. 6690, 575 U.N.T.S. 160.
9 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
done June 10, 1958, acceded to with reservations by United States, Sept. 1, 1970, 21
U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
10 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-
West Germany, art. VI, para. 2, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1840, T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
11 See U. DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 366,
371 (Bilateral Studies in Private International Law No. 4, 1972).
19871
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
institution to settle disputes between companies which are both from
industrialized states. In fact, there is no knowledge of any request for
conciliation or for arbitration having been introduced before the ICSID
between either a U.S. company and the Federal Republic of Germany,
or a West German company and the United States. 2 The ICSID Con-
vention, therefore, does not play a role in the settlement of disputes
between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.
The New York Convention, however, has had a considerable im-
pact on U.S.-West German arbitration proceedings. This impact will
not likely decrease. It should be noted that both the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany have acceded to the New York Con-
vention under "reciprocity" and "commercial disputes" reservations. 3
2. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
The first critical issue to be examined in private arbitration be-
tween a U.S. and German enterprise is the validity and scope of the
arbitration agreement inserted into their contract.
2.1. The Basic Attitude Toward Arbitration
When solving the manifold problems connected with the validity
and the scope of the arbitration agreement, recourse must frequently be
had to the basic attitudes prevailing in the respective national systems
of law toward arbitration agreements in general. There is in each na-
tional system of law a basic policy with respect to arbitration agree-
ments, either condemning, favoring, or taking an intermediate position
towards them. It is imperative for U.S. and West German companies to
know, before entering into arbitration agreements, which policy is pur-
sued by their respective legislatures towards arbitration in general, and
within such a basic framework, which positions their national courts
have taken.
"2 See 1985 ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2.
"3 Both reservations are contained in article I, paragraph 3 of the Convention:
When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying
extension under Article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity
declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforce-
ment of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State. It
may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences aris-
ing out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are con-
sidered as commercial under the national law of the State making such
declaration.
21 U.S.T. at 2519, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38.
[Vol. 9:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss1/2
U.S.-WEST GERMAN ARBITRATION
2.1.1. United States Federal Law
English common law originally was hostile to arbitration agree-
ments.1 4 Such agreements were considered to "oust" local courts from
their legitimate jurisdiction and were therefore held revocable and were
denied enforcement. This hostile English attitude was adopted in the
19th century by most U.S. courts.1 5 In 1925, however, the tide turned
in the United States when the Federal Arbitration Act" (FAA) was
enacted by Congress. Pursuant to section 2 of the Act, arbitration pro-
visions "in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce" were declared "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable."
'17
This fundamental statutory change had far-reaching consequences.
U.S. courts since then have not ceased to stress that the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, in reversing centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements, was designed to allow parties to avoid the cost and delay of
litigation and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts.1 ' A strong policy in favor of arbitration has therefore
been pursued by federal courts 9 on the basis of the Federal Arbitration
Act, leading to a liberal construction of arbitration agreements.20 The
federal courts have concluded that any doubts as to whether an arbitra-
tion clause may be interpreted to cover the asserted dispute should be
resolved in favor of arbitration unless a court could state with "positive
assurance" that this dispute was not meant to be arbitrated.21
4 See Kulkundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-84
(2d Cir. 1942); Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J.
595, 597-98 (1928).
15 See Kulkundis, 126 F.2d at 984.
16 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
17 Id.; see Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration
Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 580, 582-84
(1952) (discussing various judicial responses to irrevocability and enforceability).
IS Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974); S.A. Mineracao da
Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194 (2d Cir. 1984).
"' Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346
(1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983); Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39,
44 (3d Cir. 1978); Development Bank of the Phil. v. Chemtex Fibers, Inc., 617 F.
Supp. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Kingdom of Den., 607 F.
Supp. 1016, 1019 (E.D. Mo. 1985); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 513-16 (1974) (weighing desirability of arbitration in international transactions
against investors' right to judicial forum in securities matters).
10 Becker, 585 F.2d at 44; Singer Co. v. Tappen Co., 403 F. Supp. 322, 329
(D.N.J. 1975).
11 S. A. Mineracao, 745 F.2d at 194; Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d
166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979); Becker, 585 F.2d at 44; Gates Energy Prods., Inc. v. Yuasa
Battery Co., 599 F. Supp. 368, 371 (D. Colo. 1983).
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Finally, in 1970, the United States acceded to the New York Con-
vention which, until then, had been viewed with critical skepticism.
The articles of the New York Convention were embodied in chapter 2
of the Federal Arbitration Act.22 This ratification of the New York
Convention triggered within the U.S. a wave of optimism about and
support for international arbitration,2" and was interpreted outside the
U.S. as another token of the U.S. willingness to accept arbitration as a
regular tool for solving international business disputes.
2 4
It may be said, therefore, that in the United States there is a grow-
ing federal policy in favor of arbitration, but that this policy has had to
surmount, particularly in matters of arbitrability, certain obstacles.
Considerable progress has nonetheless been made in recent years, par-
ticularly in the context of international business relations.
2.1.2. West German Law
Under West German law, the validity, irrevocability, and enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements have, in general, never been dis-
puted. 5 Such agreements were known from the Roman law tradition
2 6
and have been recognized as legally binding upon the parties in some of
the codifications issued by the different territorial states since the 17th
century, for example, in Prussia in its Code of Civil Procedure of
22 9 U.S.C. § 201-208.
22 See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text; Aksen, Courts in IV 4 Y.B.
COM. ARB. 341 (1979); Contini, International Commercial Arbitration, 8 AM. J.
COMP. L. 283 (1959); Harnik, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 703 (1983); Quigley, Accession by the United States to
the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, 70 YALE L. J. 1049 (1961); von Mehren, The Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards Under Conventions and United States Law, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD.
343 (1983).
24 See A. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958
(1981); Delaume, L'arbitrage transnational et les tribunaux americains, 108 JOUR-
NAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 788 (1981); Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the
Convention in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L
LAW. 269 (1979); Schlosser, Verfahrensintegritit und Anerkennung von Schiedssp-
rfichen im deutsch-amerikanischen Verhaltnis, 1978 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHEN-
SCHRIFT [NJW] 455 (1978).
25 See Littauer, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und materielles Recht, 55 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR DEUTScHEN ZIVILPROZESS 1, 6 (1930). It is important to note, however, that
certain formal requirements have to be met by the arbitration agreement. See infra text
accompanying notes 32-39. It is disputed whether, in institutional arbitration, the mere
fact of someone's having joined an association will subject that member to the associa-
tion's mandatory institutional arbitration provided for by its articles of association with
respect to all disputes arising out of and in connection with his membership. See K.
SCHWAB, SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKErr 243 (3d ed. 1979) (giving further references).
26 See Littauer, supra note 25, at 30.
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1816.27 Thus, when the Federal Empire was created in 1871 and the
first Federal Code of Civil Procedure was passed in 1877,"8 a whole
chapter of the new statute was devoted to arbitration proceedings, and
the binding, irrevocable nature of the arbitration agreement was the
basis upon which those procedural regulations were grounded.
Importantly, the equal standing that arbitration proceedings have
with court proceedings and the enforceability of arbitration agreements
does not violate articles 92 and 101 para.(1) of the Fundamental Law
(Constitution) of 1949 of the Federal Republic of Germany.2" Article
92 provides that the power to adjudicate legal disputes is vested with
the judges; and pursuant to article 101 para.(a), the exercise of judicial
powers by extraordinary courts is prohibited and no one may be de-
prived of his right guaranteed by the Constitution to have his matters
decided by duly appointed judges.30 Since arbitration proceedings re-
quire the existence of an arbitration agreement voluntarily entered into
by both parties, articles 92 and 101 para.(1) of the Fundamental Law
are held inapplicable to arbitration agreements and arbitration proceed-
ings.-" Hence, in West German law there has never been a bias against
the validity, irrevocability, and enforceability of arbitration agreements.
Parties to U.S.-West German business transactions entering into
arbitration agreements do not have to fear hostility towards their agree-
ment on either side of the Atlantic. It is important, therefore, for them
to know from the beginning which rules of law they have to observe in
order to secure the enforceability and workability of their agreements.
Attention must be paid to the rules regarding the form of the arbitra-
tion agreement, its substantive requirements, the arbitrability of the
dispute, and the autonomy of the arbitration agreement.
2.2. The Form of the Arbitration Agreement
The form of the arbitration agreement does not seem to present
serious difficulties. Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires
that the arbitration agreement be a "written provision" or "in writing."
S7 See id. at 13.
28 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] (W. Ger. 1877).
39 GRUNDGESETZ, arts. 92, 101, para. (1) 1949 Bundesge setzblatt [BGB] I (W.
Ger.).
3o Id. art. 101, para. (1).
s Judgment of July 3, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 65 Bundesgerichtshof
in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 61-62; Judgment of Aug. 23, 1963, Bundesarbeitsgericht
(BAGE), reprinted in 17 NJW 268 (1964); Schlosser in KOMMENTAR FUR ZIVIL-
PROZESSORDNUNG, annot. I, (3) preceding § 1025 (F. Stein & M. Jonas 19th ed.
1975).
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This requirement is construed liberally by U.S. courts. 2 The agree-
ment need not be signed, nor need it be incorporated in the contract
itself, but may be contained in an exchange of letters, telexes, or tele-
grams. The agreement does not have to be part of the same contractual
instrument as the main contract, but may be listed in an annex attached
to it.38 West German law is even more permissive. An arbitration
agreement does not have to be in writing, if it is entered into between
merchants. 4
Similarly, the "in writing" requirement found in article II, para-
graph 2 of the New York Convention of 1958 is liberally construed in
the United States 5 and in the Federal Republic of Germany. 6 This is
of special importance for parties who do not envision seeking the en-
forcement of an eventual award under U.S. or West German law, but
32 See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. S.C.M. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 905, 906 (D.
Conn. 1970) (standard language printed on reverse side of purchaser's order form was
enough to create agreement to arbitrate).
11 See Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth Petrochemicals, Inc., 334
F. Supp. 1013, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Holtzmann, Report of United States Arbi-
tration Law, 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 116, 119 (1977).
34 Section 1027 of the West German Code of Civil Procedure in English transla-
tion reads:
(1) The arbitration agreement must be concluded expressly and in writing;
the instrument must not contain any agreements other than those referring
to the arbitration procedure. Admission to the arbitral discussions on the
substance of the case overrides any faults in form.
(2) The above provision does not apply if the arbitration agreement is a
business matter for the two parties and if neither of the two parties be-
longs to the trading professions set out in Section 4 of the Commercial
Code.
(3) Insofar as, in accordance with para. 2, the arbitration agreement does
not have to be laid down in writing, each party may require a written
instrument concerning the agreement.
ZPO § 1027, translated in 0. GLOSSNER, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE FED-
ERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 42 (1984).
" Upon United States accession to the New York Convention in 1970, chapter 2
was added to the FAA. That chapter states:
"[a]n arbitration agreement . . . including, a[n] . . . agreement described in section 2
of this title, falls under the Convention." 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982). Thus any agreement
meeting the existing "in writing" requirement of previous section 2 will qualify for
enforcement under the Convention. See Beronum Aktiengesellschaft v. Societa Industri-
ale "Tresse" di Dr. Domenico e Dr. Antonio dal Ferro, 471 F. Supp. 1163, 1170
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (section 202 incorporates section 2 requirement of a writing).
S" See K. SCHWAB, SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 347 (3d ed. 1979); Kornmeier &
Sandrock in 2 HANDBUCH DER INTERNATIONALEN VERTRAGSGESTALTUNG 923
nn.89, 90 (0. Sandrock ed. 1980); Schlosser, supra note 31, annex A(III) to § 1044,
annot. 111(3) to art. 2 of the New York Convention. It has to be noted, however, that
the first alternative in part 2 of article II of the New York Convention ("in a contract
or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties") is construed by some German writ-
ers as requiring the personal signature of the parties, whereas a signature by stamp or
facsimile is considered to be insufficient. See K. SCHWAB, supra; Schlosser, supra note
31, annex A (III) to § 1044.
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rather intend to apply for enforcement under article V of the New
York Convention. Since article II of the New York Convention super-
sedes domestic law,37 only the formal requirements in that article need
be observed to secure recognition and enforcement of a foreign award.
The liberal interpretation of article II of the New York Convention in
both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany enhances
the workability of international private arbitration in the trade between
these two countries.
It must be noted, however, that if a contract has first been con-
cluded orally without an arbitration agreement, and subsequently a let-
ter of confirmation including such an arbitration agreement is sent to
the other party and remains unanswered, the "in-writing" requirement
laid down in article II of the New York Convention is not met. Thus,
this condition is not fulfilled if one party has proposed the arbitration
agreement "in writing," and the offeree has remained silent. This rule
seems to be firmly established in West German decisional law as well
as in West German legal doctrine."8 Another ruling of a West German
court interpreting article II of the New York Convention should also be
noted here. The court held that if an arbitration agreement has been
signed by an agent of either party, the agent must have a written power
of attorney. Otherwise, by means of a mere oral granting of power of
attorney, the form required by article II could be circumvented."9
2.3. Substantive Requirements
2.3.1. The Meeting of the Minds
Both U.S. and West German domestic law, as well as article II of
the New York Convention,40 require the existence of a "meeting of the
37 See Sanders, supra note 24, at 286. One cannot, however, interpret the express
reference in section 202 of the FAA to section 2 of that Act as intending that United
States law supersede the Convention as to the "in writing" requirement. See 9 U.S.C. §
2 (1982).
3, See Judgment of Nov. 8, 1971, Oberlandesgericht, Duesseldorf, English lan-
guage summary in 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 237 (1977); Judgment of Dec. 16, 1965, Lan-
dgericht, Bremen, English language summary in 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 233 (1977). For a
similar finding by a Swiss court, see Judgment of June 6, 1967, Tribunal du Canton
Geneve, English language summary in 1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 199 (1976); see also
Kornmeier & Sandrock, supra note 36.
3, See Judgment of March 16, 1977, Landgericht, Hamburg, English language
summary in 9 Y.B. COM. ARB. 274 (1978); Mezger, Comment, in 1979 RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 486, 486 (1979).
40 Within this context, the following should be emphasized: section 202 of the
FAA refers to section 2 of that Act to determine the definition of an arbitration agree-
ment for purposes of applying the New York Convention. Therefore, the meeting of the
minds is examined, in the United States, according to the same rules of domestic law,
irrespective of whether the arbitration agreement is subject to the New York Conven-
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minds" of the parties to an arbitration agreement.4 According to U.S.42
and West German laws, 43 the general principles of contract apply, sub-
ject to the consideration, however, that an arbitration agreement is of
utmost importance for the future position of any of the parties and that
the existence of a meeting of the minds is of special importance.
Regardless of whether this problem is to be solved under article II
of the New York Convention or under the respective national laws, it
seems to be established in both U.S. and German law that a meeting of
the minds can normally be inferred from the fact that the arbitration
agreement was contained if not in the main contract itself, then in a
document attached to it44 or in the general conditions printed on the
reverse side of the contract form.45 If, however, in the case of a refer-
ence to general conditions, a copy of those conditions has not been at-
tached to the contract or to the exchange of letters, telexes, etc., or if
such conditions have not been printed on the back of the contract or in
a party's letter, it will be difficult to assume that the other party has
been informed about such conditions, that it has been able to approve
tion or to section 2 of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
It is doubtful whether this is equally true for German law. No German legislative
act has tied the interpretation of article II of the New York Convention back to a
provision of German law. Hence, German courts might construe article II indepen-
dently of any provision of their domestic law. Even in the case of such an autonomous
interpretation, German courts might have recourse to their general principles of con-
tract formation since, the literal wording of article II would not yield any result. Both
methods of implementing article II of the New York Convention would, therefore,
probably lead to the same result in Germany.
Furthermore, both the United States and German parties to a commercial contract
and/or arbitration agreement may, by an express or tacit stipulation, submit any dis-
pute arising thereunder to the law of a third country (England or Switzerland, for
example). In such a case that particular third state's domestic rules or special rules, if
any, for the interpretation of the New York Convention would govern the examination
of the meeting of the minds.
41 See, e.g., Par-Knit Mills, Inc., v. Stockbridge Fabric Co., 636 F. 2d 51, 54-55
(3d Cir. 1980).
4" See Beronum, 417 F. Supp. at 1170.
43 Judgment of Feb. 12, 1976, Bundesgerichtshof, English language summary in
2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 242 (1977).
44 See id.; Judgment of Jan. 11, 1978, Landgericht, Zweibrilcken, English lan-
guage summary in 4 Y.B. COM. ARB. 262 (1979); Kornmeier & Sandrock, supra note
36. In the reverse situation, an arbitration agreement in the main contract has been
held applicable to documents referring to that contract. See Coastal States Trading, Inc.
v. Zenith Navigation S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (where a bill of
lading contained in bold face type the clause "[aill conditions and exceptions of the
Charter Party being considered embodied in this Bill of Lading" and the charter party
included an arbitration clause, litigation arising from the bill of lading was referred to
arbitration).
45 Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. S.C.M. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 905, 906 (D. Conn.
1970); Oregon-Pacific Forest Prods. Corp. v. Welsh Panel Co., 248 F. Supp. 903, 906
(D. Or. 1965); Kornmeier & Sandrock, supra note 36.
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them, and that it has agreed to refer any litigation to an arbitral tribu-
nal.' An established course of dealing might, however, satisfy the re-
quirement that with each individual contract a party has to communi-
cate its general conditions to its partner.4
7
2.3.2. The Coverage of the Dispute by the Arbitration Agreement
The language most frequently used in arbitration agreements 8
seems to be that all disputes "arising out of 49 or relating to the contract
or the breach thereof" 50 are subject to arbitration. This language is
broad enough, under U.S. and West German law, to accomplish the
goal of assigning all eventual disputes to arbitration. For such language
would cover not only claims based, for example, on fraud in the induce-
ment of the contract itself,5" but also all statutory claims emerging in
connection with the conclusion of the contract or with its performance
by the parties.52
"' Kornmeier & Sandrock, supra note 36.
41 Oregon-Pacific, 248 F. Supp. at 907.
48 The widespread use of the following language seems to be due, at least in part,
to the recommendation given by the American Arbitration Association of a "Standard
Arbitration Clause" which reads: "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating
to this contract, on the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration ... "
AMERICAN ARB. ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AS AMENDED AND IN EF-
FEcT FEB. 1, 1984, reprinted in R. RODMAN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION WITH
FORMS 118 (West Handbook Series 1984); see Hoellering, Arbitrability of Disputes, 41
Bus. LAW. 125, 125-26 (1985).
"' Some arbitration clauses do not speak of disputes arising "out of" a contract,
but of disputes arising "under" and/or "occurring under" it. The precise language
used is generally unimportant. See Griffin v. Semperil of America, Inc., 414 F. Supp.
1384, 1391-92 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (phrase "arising out of" created broad arbitration
agreement despite deliberate omission of words "or relating to"). But see S.A. Minera-
cao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194 (2d Cir. 1984) (some
claims could conceivably "occur under" a contract and yet not "arise under" it).
50 In German such a clause would read: "Streitigkeiten aus oder in Verbindung
mit diesem Vertrag". A literal translation of the phrase "or the breach thereof" would
not have to be added because disputes of the latter nature would already be covered by
the German language just quoted.
"' According to a well-established U.S. doctrine, the arbitral tribunal would not,
however, have jurisdiction to decide on claims based upon fraud in the inducement of
the arbitration agreement itself because such a claim would involve the very existence of
the arbitration agreement. See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text; see also
Hoellering, supra note 6, at 129-30. Under U.S. law, the arbitral tribunal is denied the
power to rule on its own jurisdiction.
52 If one party would, for example, allege the contract to be in violation of the
Sherman Act and would therefore request from the other the payment of treble dam-
ages under that statute, such dispute, though implying a statutory claim, would be
encompassed by the arbitration agreement. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrylser-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3354 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984); Ex parte Alabama Oxygen Co., 433 So. 2d 1158 (1983), vacated
sub nom. York International v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 465 U.S. 1016 (1984).
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In construing the applicability of arbitration clauses to particular
disputes, U.S. courts often begin with the principle that all questions of
the arbitration agreement's interpretation, construction, validity, revo-
cability, and enforceability relate to federal law.58 They then consider
the strong policy pursued by federal courts favoring arbitration, espe-
cially in the context of international agreements."M This leads very often
to the conclusion that arbitration agreements are to be liberally con-
strued55 in conferring upon them a meaning "as broad as possible."56
Finally, it is a rule frequently enunciated by U.S. federal courts that
any doubts as to whether an arbitration agreement may be interpreted
to cover the asserted dispute should be resolved in favor of arbitration
unless a court can state with "positive assurance" that this dispute was
not meant to be arbitrated.57 Therefore, language excluding certain dis-
putes from arbitration should be "clear and unambiguous" or "unmis-
takably clear.?
58
Under West German law, the interpretation and construction of
arbitration agreements are subject to the general rules governing the
interpretation and construction, in private law, of all legal transactions.
There is, remarkably enough, no principle prescribing a narrow inter-
pretation of the arbitration agreement, even though jurisdiction by ordi-
nary state courts is the general rule in private litigation, with arbitra-
tion an exception requiring the existence of a special agreement to
arbitrate.59 On the contrary, it is well-settled in the law of the Federal
Republic of Germany that, in cases of doubt, arbitration agreements
have to be construed rather broadly.6" The same principle of broad in-
" See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 105 S. Ct. 3346; Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc.
v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F. 2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1978).
" See supra note 21.
15 Becker, 585 F. 2d at 44; see also Singer Co. v. Tappan Co., 403 F. Supp. 322,
328-29 (D.N.J. 1975).
58 S.A. Mineracao da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 194 (2d
Cir. 1984).
5 See supra note 21.
5 Wire Serv. Guild v. United Press Int'l, 623 F.2d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1980) (cita-
tions omitted); see also Singer Co., 403 F. Supp. at 329 ("[Flederal courts are ... to
apply ... a federal rule that seemingly requires a clearly expressed intent not to arbi-
trate an issue before such issue can be ruled one for judicial determination; and, fur-
ther, that if the issue is a doubtful one, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion.") (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
5 See K. SCHWAB, supra note 36, at 19.
60 See Judgment of Dec. 10, 1970, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 26 Betriebs-Ber-
ater 369, 370; Judgment of Feb. 27, 1970, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 53 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 315, 320-23; K. SCHWAB,
supra note 36, at 19 nn. 31-35; Habscheid, Aus der hchstrichterlichen Recht-
sprechung zur Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, 26 KONKURS-, TREUHAND-, UND SCHIEDSGER-
ICHTSWESEN 2, 3 (1965). See generally Schlosser, supra note 31, § 1025, annot. 12.
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terpretation exists when determining whether an arbitration agreement
has come into existence.'
Thus, under neither U.S. nor West German law are arbitration
agreements subject to narrow interpretation or construction which
could impede the result intended by the parties.
2.3.3. The Commercial Nature of the Transaction
Problems of only minor importance arise from the requirement,
established in domestic U.S. law and in reservations made both by the
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany to the New York
Convention,62 that the dispute referred to the arbitral tribunal be either
cmaritime" or "commercial" in nature. According to section 2 of the
FAA, only arbitration agreements "in any maritime transaction" or in
a contract "evidencing a transaction involving commerce," shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." Pursuant to the reservations made
by the United States and by the Federal Republic of Germany on the
basis of article 1, paragraph 3 of the New York Convention, both states
"will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal rela-
tionships . . . which are considered as commercial under the national
law of the state making such declaration."" Section 202 of the FAA
specifies that only an arbitration agreement arising out of a legal rela-
tionship "which is considered as commercial, including a transaction,
contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under the
Convention." '65 Under German law, the notion of a "commercial trans-
action" is so amply defined that virtually all transactions between pri-
vate companies are covered by it.66
Hence, in private business transactions between enterprises in the
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, this "commerce"
requirement normally will be met by the agreements implementing
61 See Schlosser, supra note 31, § 1025, annot. 14.
6 See infra note 64.
6 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
done June 10, 1958, acceded to with reservations by United States, Sept. 1, 1970, art.
I, para. 3, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208
(1982)).
65 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982). For an interpretation of this section, see von Mehren,
supra note 23, at 352; see also Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management , Inc., 517
F. Supp. 948, 952-53 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
6 See HANDELSGESETZBUCH [HGBJ § 343(1) (1983) (W. Ger. Commercial
Code), translated in BusINEss TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY app. §§ 2-72 (B. Ruster
ed. 1985)("Commercial transactions are all transactions by a merchant which relate to
the operation of his business.")
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such transactions.8 7 This seems to be true even for contracts for mili-
tary defense weaponry in which the government of one country acts as
a buyer of weapons produced by corporations of the other country. One
limitation in this regard is indicated by Wijsmuller v. United States,68
which was decided by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York in 1976. In that case, the captain of a U.S. warship had
signed a contract with a Dutch corporation for the salvage of his ship.
The contract provided, inter alia, that all disputes arising out of it
should be brought before a London arbitration panel. The court held
the arbitration agreement void, stating that, "[w]hatever uncertainties
may arise when agencies of government engage in commercial transac-
tions, relations arising out of the activities of warships have never been
regarded as 'commercial' within the context of sovereign immunity." '
2.3.4. The Arbitrability of the Dispute
The greatest recent advances in this area concern the arbitrability
of various subject matters.70 Under West German law, arbitrability of
the subject matter was never a great problem. According to section
1025(2) of the West German Code of Civil Procedure, an arbitration
agreement can claim legal recognition insofar as the parties to the dis-
pute are authorized to dispose of the subject matter of their dispute by
an amicable settlement." Hence, there is a clear parallel between the
power to settle a dispute and the power to enter into an arbitration
agreement with regard to it. In principle, all commercial matters, in-
cluding disputes on certain matters of antitrust, labor, and industrial
property, are susceptible of being arbitrated.
Section 91 of the West German Act on Restrictive Trade Practices
provides that arbitration agreements covering future legal disputes aris-
ing from restrictive trade agreements or understandings (permissible
under certain antitrust provisions) shall be null and void, unless they
permit each contracting party to bring their disputes before the ordi-
67 See, e.g., Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Maritima, 477 F. Supp. 737,
742 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
68 3 Y.B. COM. ARB. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
'9 Id. The discussion has not addressed the general question of waiver of immu-
nity by entering into an arbitration agreement.
70 There is substantial support for this proposition. See generally Sanders, supra
note 24, at 271 (courts of the contracting states have generally upheld the validity and
enforceability of arbitration agreements in many different areas); Delaume, supra note
24, at 792-94; Aksen, supra note 23, at 348-50; Harnik, supra note 23, at 704 ("in
approximately 100 internationally reported cases applying the New York Convention
enforcement has been refused only 3 or 4 times for public policy reasons").
71 ZPO § 1025(2) (W. Ger.).
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nary courts instead of arbitration panels.72 Disputes arising out of anti-
trust matters are thus open, to a large extent, subject to certain precon-
ditions, to private arbitration. If an arbitration agreement concerns
future disputes arising out of export cartel contracts, an even more leni-
ent rule in section 91 of the West German Act applies.7 ' The insertion
of such an arbitration clause into an export cartel contract, upon appli-
cation to the competent cartel authority, may be authorized. This
would then allow the contracting parties to dispense with fulfilling the
general requirement that the contract permit them to bring the dispute
before the ordinary courts.
In matters of industrial property, arbitrability is recognized with-
out limitations in West German law.7 4 Though arbitration agreements
seem to be rather rare in this field,7 5 parties to disputes bearing on the
existence, extent, or enforceability of industrial property rights, as well
as the license agreements entered into with respect to those rights, may
settle such disputes amicably and hence agree upon bringing them
before arbitral tribunals. 6
A reverse approach to private arbitration is taken under West
German law in labor matters, where only disputes between employers
and labor unions and disputes between certain employers and certain
groups of employees can be taken before special arbitral tribunals. The
bulk of private labor disputes thus are foreclosed from private
arbitration.
77
It may, therefore, be said that West German law, within certain
limits, always has been open-minded to the arbitrability of business dis-
putes. On the basis of the clear-cut rule in section 1025(1) of the West
German Code of Civil Procedure, West German courts could never dis-
72 GESETZ GEGEN WErrBEWERBSBESCHRXNKUNGEN (GWB) § 91 (1980) (West
German antitrust statute), translated in B. RUSTER, supra note 66, app. 3-67.
73 Id.
7" Nasteiski, in PATENTGESETZ UND GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESETZ § 47 n.104 (E.
Reimer 3d ed. 1968) (patent disputes); Nordemann, in URHEBERRECHT 547 (F.
Fromm & W. Nordemann 4th ed. 1979) (copyrights).
7' Nastelski, supra note 74, § 47 n.96.
76 For certain copyright matters, it is provided by statute that all claims must be
brought before a certain arbitral body (rather than before the district court) while an
appeal is made to the competent court of appeals. See Gesetz fiber die Wahrnehmung
von Urheberrechten und verwandten Schutzrechten § 14, 15, 1965 BGBI 1 1294 (W.
Ger.).
77 Pursuant to section 101 of the Code of Procedure for Labor Courts, employer's
unions and trade unions can agree to refer their contract disputes to certain arbitral
tribunals. They can also agree that their members will take their disputes to these
arbitral tribunals (such an agreement would be binding on their members). Such agree-
ments may be entered into, however, only with regard to certain kinds of employees,
such as stage or circus artists, movie actors, or sea captains and sailors. ARBEITSGER-
ICHTSESETZ § 101 (W. Ger.).
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regard an arbitration agreement upon the ground that by such agree-
ment they would be unduly ousted from their proper jurisdiction."8
When looking at the problem of arbitrability under U.S. federal
law, the two turning points already alluded to 9 significantly changed
basic attitudes towards arbitration.
The first turning point was the enactment of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act in 1925,80 which reversed the prior hostility toward arbitration
agreements and introduced a new policy in their favor. After 1925, fed-
eral courts still continued, however, to hold several important matters
nonarbitrable, for example, matters relating to the validity and in-
fringement of a patent or any right under a patent,"' certain claims
based on U.S. securities laws,82 as well as claims deriving from U.S.
antitrust statutes.83 Inevitably, many international contracts concerned
to some extent these areas. A great many business contracts concluded
between U.S. and West German companies were, therefore, nonarbi-
trable. This feature of U.S. arbitration law was regarded with great
anxiety in the Federal Republic of Germany."
Until the second turn in U.S. arbitration law came about from the
mid-1970s to mid-1980s, West German enterprises felt helpless in their
dealings with their U.S. partners because of the following dilemma. If,
on the one hand, they submitted the settlement of their disputes with
their U.S. partners to arbitration, they ran the risk that a U.S. court
would disregard either an agreement providing for arbitration, or the
decision of an arbitral panel reached, e.g., in England, in any other
"neutral" country, or under the auspices of an international institution
of arbitration (e.g., the ICC in Paris). On the other hand, proceedings
could meanwhile be instituted against them by their U.S. partners
before a U.S. court. Thus, arbitration agreements into which West
German enterprises had entered with their U.S. partners were regarded
7 ZPO § 1025 (1) (W. Ger.).
7 See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
80 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (1982).
81 See, e.g., Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1057,
1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal dismissed, 516 F. 2d 975 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 913 (1975).
I' See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1953).
83 See, e.g., Robb v. Lewis, 488 F. 2d 41 (2d Cir. 1974).
" See P. SCHLOSSER, ENTWICKLUNGSTENDENZEN IN RECHT UND PRAXIS DER
INTERNATIONALEN SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 47 (1976); Dietrich, Internationale
Schiedsvereinbarungen von Amerikanischen Gerichten, 40 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFr ZUM
AUSLXNDISCHEN UND INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT [R.Z.A.I.P.] 1 (1976);
Howaldt & Howe, Schiedsklauseln in Internationalen Vertr~igen und deren Anerken-
nung in den USA, 21 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 135 (1975);
Pagenberg, Das Schiedsgerichtswesen in den USA, 1977 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSS-
CHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 12, 17.
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as unsafe, unreliable, and insecure.8 5 In spite of the FAA, the fear re-
mained that West German enterprises would find their disputes before
U.S. courts, where proceedings, in comparison with those carried on
before European national courts, are considerably more expensive and
where many features of these proceedings, like pretrial discovery, seem
strange to European lawyers and businessmen.
In addition, if such West German companies entered into forum
selection agreements with their U.S. partners (providing, e.g., for the
jurisdiction of English, Swiss, or Canadian courts), they were not as-
sured that these agreements would be honored. Their U.S. partners
were, as a general rule, not prevented from suing them before U.S.
courts. Thus, neither forum selection clauses choosing a European fo-
rum nor arbitration agreements providing for arbitration either in Eu-
rope or in the United States were, in the eyes of West German compa-
nies, safe enough to shield them against being dragged into litigation
before U.S. courts. These feelings of unreliability and insecurity were
only temporarily appeased by the famous Zapata doctrine of the U.S.
Supreme Court," which was hailed as the great turning point8 ' in U.S.
arbitration thinking. 8 After having been restricted by later decisions of
federal courts" (e.g., to admiralty matters),9" however, the doctrine
turned out to be merely the beginning of U.S. nonouster theory, but not
yet a real reversal of that doctrine.9 '
Today, a second turning point can truly be detected in the devel-
opment of U.S. arbitration law, which began in 1974 with the United
States Supreme Court decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,92 and
was crystallized with the 1985 decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
85 See, e.g., sources cited in note 84, supra.
" The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
87 See Behrens, Internationale Gerichtsstands - vereinbarungen vor amerikanis-
chen Gerichten, 38 R.Z.A.I.P. 590, 593 (1974); Boehmer & Jander, Anerkennung von
Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen in den USA, 1972 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES
BETRIEBS - BERATERS 449; Kohler, Wirksamkeit von Gerichtsstands-und Schiedsger-
ichtsvereinbarungen in Internationalen Vertriigen in der Amerikanischen Recht-
sprechung, 22 REcHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 507 (1976).
88 The United States Supreme Court had already dealt with this issue in 1874.
See Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (20 Wall. 1874) ("There is no doubt of
the general principle that parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary court of their
jurisdiction.")
8' See Keaty v. Freeport Indonesia, Inc., 503 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1974); Cop-
perweld Steel Co. v. Demag - Mannesmann - Boehler, 354 F. Supp. 571 (W.D. Pa.
1973).
11 See Copperweld Steel Co., 354 F. Supp. at 573.
"I See Jung & Sandrock, supra note 36, at 865-72; see also Delaume, What is an
International Contract? An American and Gallic Dilemma, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
258 (1979).
92 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.9" Thus, the former feeling of unreliabil-
ity and insecurity has to a great extent disappeared. West German en-
terprises now trust that their arbitration agreements with their U.S.
partners will be recognized by U.S. courts, even though arbitrability of
the subject matter might sometimes seem doubtful under U.S. law. In
Scherk, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected its holding in Wilko v.
Swan.94 This earlier decision had held that claims based on a violation
of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) were not arbitrable, since any
advance agreement to arbitrate such matters would constitute a waiver
not permitted by section 14 of the 1933 Act, which was designed to
protect investors and to require issuers, underwriters, and dealers to
make full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in inter-
state and foreign commerce. The Supreme Court in Scherk found "cru-
cial differences" between the arbitration agreement involved in Wilko
and the one which had been signed in the present case. 5 Holding that
the arbitration agreement in Scherk was embedded in a "truly interna-
tional" 96 contract and that such a contract "involves considerations and
policies significantly different" from those found controlling in Wilko, it
came to the conclusion that the policies of the Federal Arbitration Act
of 1925 should prevail and that the arbitration agreement in the inter-
national context should therefore be binding, irrevocable, and enforcea-
ble since its parties would otherwise be exposed to an intolerable uncer-
tainty, which would
almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract
touching two or more countries, each with its own substan-
tive laws and conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision
specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be
litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost
indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness
and predictability essential to any international business
transactions.
97
The 1982 Amendment Act98 expressly established the arbitrability
of all disputes arising with respect to the validity and infringement of a
patent or any right under a patent. According to that Act, the parties to
93 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
94 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see also C. WEHRINGER, ARBITRATION, PRECEPTS AND
PRINCIPLES 22 (1969); Hoellering, supra note 48, at 132-35; Sturges & Murphy,
supra note 17, at 580.
:5 417 U.S. at 515.
6 Id.
97 Id. at 516-17.
98 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1982).
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a contract may voluntarily agree to arbitrate a broad range of patent
disputes, both pending and future, and such agreements and awards
may be enforced under title 9 of the U.S. Code.9
The reversal in U.S. arbitration law finally crystallized in 1985
when the Supreme Court handed down Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc 00
In overturning the long-standing principle of the nonarbitrability
of antitrust claims, 01 the Supreme Court concluded in Mitsubishi that
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign
and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the interna-
tional commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes
would require enforcement of arbitration agreements embodied in in-
99 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208 (1982); see Hoellering, New Opportunities for Pat-
ent Arbitration, 188 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 16, 1982, at 1.
100 105 S. Ct. 3345 (1985). This decision has been extensively commented upon,
both in the United States and in Europe. For a view from the United States, see Alexis,
Arbitration: Public Policy Exception to Arbitration of Antitrust Issues, 25 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 427 (1984) Allison, Arbitration of Private Antitrust Claims in Interna-
tional Trade: A Study in the Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a
World Market, 18 INT'L L.&P. 361 (1986); Hoellering, supra note 48, at 135-38;
Lesser, Arbitration: Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims in International Tribunals, 27
HARV. INT'L L.J. 227 (1986) Smith, Determining the Arbitrability of International
Antitrust Disputes, 8 J. Comp. Bus. & Capital Market L. 197 (1986). For the Euro-
pean perspective, see Gill, Note on the Mitsubishi v. Soler Decision, 25 Swiss REV.
INT'L ANTITRUST L. 67 (1985): Jarvin, Arbitrability of Antitrust Disputes: The Mit-
subishi v. Soler Case, 2 J. INT'L ARE. 69 (1985); Lange & Wiessner, Die Schied-
sfdhigkeit Internationalen Antitrust Streitigeiten, 31 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN
WIRTSCHAFT 757 (1985); Ovington, Arbitration and U.S. Antitrust Law: A Conflict
of Policies, 2 J. INT'L ARB. 54 (1985); Editorial, U.S. Antitrust Law Claims Arbitra-
ble, 1985 J. Bus. L. 363 (1985). For the most part, these authors view the decision as a
landmark in the development of international arbitration.
101 See American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F. 2d 821, 828
(2d Cir. 1968) ("antitrust claims . . . are inappropriate for arbitration"); see also Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 733 F.2d 155, 162-64 (1st Cir.
1983), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 3346 (1985); Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th
Cir. 1974); Helfenbein v. International Indus., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1971); Power
Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980, 983-84 (9th Cir. 1970); Hunt
v. Mobil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
The American Safety doctrine reasoned that private plaintiffs asserting their rights
under the antitrust statutes were acting as private attorney generals in protecting the
public's interest, and thereby played a pivotal role in aiding governmental enforcement
of antitrust laws. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826. Under these circumstances, it
could not be assumed that Congress intended such claims to be resolved elsewhere than
in the courts. Id. at 827. Furthermore, it was maintained that the complexity of anti-
trust issues, and the extensiveness and diversity of the evidence involved in antitrust
cases rendered antitrust claims more suitable for judicial rather than arbitration pro-
ceedings, Cobb, 488 F. 2d 41; thus, it would be questionable to entrust the decision of
antitrust issues to commercial arbitrators, who "are frequently drawn for their business
expertises," when "it is business community generally that is regulated by the antitrust
laws." Id. (citation omitted).
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ternational contracts, even assuming that a contrary result would be
forthcoming in a domestic context.
102
The potential complexity of antitrust matters did not suffice to
preclude arbitration, 03 since international arbitrators could often be
drawn from the legal as well as the business community and that it,
therefore, seemed unjustified to indulge the presumption that the par-
ties and the arbitral body conducting the proceeding would be unable
or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitra-
tors.104 It was thus held necessary for U.S. courts to subordinate domes-
tic notions of arbitrability to the international policy favoring commer-
cial arbitration.105
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Scherk and Mitsubishi
have finally created in the United States a climate favorable towards
international arbitration that can be trusted by foreign companies.106
West German companies, when entering into arbitration agreements
with their U.S. partners, will heavily rely upon the rationales reflected
in these decisions. It would be highly detrimental to international arbi-
tration if the ratio decidendi of these decisions would, in any respect,
ever be reversed or ignored by U.S. courts in the future.
2.3.5. The Autonomy of the Arbitration Agreement
All problems arising from the autonomy of the arbitration agree-
ment have a considerable impact upon the workability of international
arbitration. Two kinds of problems usually arise from autonomy con-
siderations: 10 (1) the severability of the arbitration agreement from the
main contract, and (2) the power of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its
102 Mitsubishi, 105 S.Ct. at 3355.
103 Id. at 3357.
104 Id. at 3358.
105 Id. at 3360.
108 Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi, another category of statu-
tory claims was held nonarbitrable: claims deriving from the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). See S.A.
Mineracao da Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566, 574 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), affd., 745 F. 2d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 1984). In response to the new policy enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi, the rulings in Samitri were reversed and the
RICO claims were held arbitrable. See Development Bank of the Phil. v. Chemtex
Fibers, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
107 See Glossner, Federal Republic of Germany (Report on its Arbitration Law),
4 Y. B. CoM. ARB. 60, 65-66 (1979); Schwab, Die Entscheidung des Schiedsgerichts
fiber seine eigene Zustdndigkeit: Eine Stellungnahme zum Verhdltnis von Hauptver-
trag und Schiedsvertrag und zur sog. Kompetenz-Kompetenz des Schiedsgerichts, 22
KONKURS-, TREUHAND- UND SCHIEDSGERIc:HTWESEN 17 (1961); Goldman, The
Complementary Roles ofJudges and Arbitrators in Ensuring that International Com-
mercial Arbitration is Effective, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: SIXTY YEARS OF
ICC ARBITRATION. A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 257, 262-64 (1984).
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own jurisdiction.
The question of the severability of the arbitration agreement from
the main contract results from the contention of one or the other party
that the main contract has not come into existence, that it always has
been void, or that it has been voided (e.g., by a later cancellation which
one party was entitled to pronounce) after originally having been en-
forceable. In such a situation, the issue arises whether: (1) the nonexis-
tence or nullity of the main contract also affects the arbitration agree-
ment, thus removing any basis for the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal, (2) or the arbitration agreement is autonomous and may be
valid and enforceable on its own, thus enabling the arbitral tribunal to
decide upon the existence or nonexistence, the validity or nullity, the
enforceability or unenforceability of the main contract, notwithstanding
the fact that the arbitration agreement itself is a constituent part of that
nonexistent or nullity-stricken main contract.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Prima Paint Co. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg.,108 U.S. law seems fairly settled in this re-
spect.109 That is, under section 4 of the FAA, though the main contract
may never have come into existence and though it may have been null
and void from its inception or may have been voided or cancelled after
a certain period of operation, the arbitral tribunal may proceed to exer-
cise its jurisdiction on the deficient main contract, provided only that
the existence, validity, and enforceability of the arbitration agreement
-in itself is not in dispute between the parties and that there is no re-
striction in the arbitral agreement operating as a bar against the juris-
diction of the arbitral tribunal. 10
The same point of view prevails in West German law. If the main
contract is alleged to be nonexistent, null, void, or for any other reason
unenforceable, the West German Supreme Court 1 asserts a presump-
108 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see also Hoellering, supra note 48, at 129, 130.
109 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974); see also 2 J.
WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 11-14
(1979) (discussing the clear rule of separability in federal cases and the inclination of
state courts to follow federal rules).
110 Prima Paint Co., 388 U.S. at 403-04; see also Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 4 (1982) (discussed in Prima Paint Co., 388 U.S. at 403 & n.11).
Although this solution of the issue of severability has never been spelled out ex-
pressly in any case affecting maritime contracts or foreign commerce, U.S. courts have
in effect followed this ruling in such cases. See Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F.
Supp. 14, 22 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Global Maritime Leasing Panama, Inc. v. M/S North
Breeze, 349 F. Supp. 779, 785 (D.R.I. 1972); see also Delaume, supra note 24, at 799.
"' Judgment of Feb. 27, 1970, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 53 BGHZ 315, 318-
19, 321-23; Judgment of Sept. 22, 1977, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 69 BGHZ 260,
261; see also H. MAIER, HANDBUCH DER SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 74-75 (1979); K.
SCHWAB, supra note 36, at 27; Schwab, supra note 107, at 17-21.
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tion in favor of the validity of the arbitration agreement, reasoning that
the parties presumably wanted the arbitral tribunal to rule upon all
matters relating to the contract. This holds true particularly when the
parties have phrased their arbitration agreement in general language
which does not reflect any intention that the jurisdiction of their arbi-
tral tribunal should be confined to certain specified matters unrelated to
the validity of their arbitration clause.
The attitude of both U.S. and West German law is different, how-
ever, with regard to the power of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its
own jurisdiction (so-called "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" according to West
German legal terminology).
In the United States, such power is firmly denied to arbitral tribu-
nals. 112 If the existence, validity, enforceability, annulment, or cancella-
tion of an arbitration agreement is in dispute between the parties, or if
there is a dispute about whether the wording of an arbitration agree-
ment covers a certain lawsuit, the arbitral tribunal under U.S. law is
considered to be without jurisdiction to decide upon these matters, since
the exercise of such jurisdiction would require the existence of a valid
and enforceable arbitration agreement.113 As long as a valid and en-
forceable agreement does not exist, the competent state court cannot be
ousted of its jurisdiction.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, opinions are divided as to
the power of the arbitral tribunal to decide upon its own jurisdiction in
the absence of an express, explicit agreement of the parties conferring
jurisdiction upon the arbitral tribunal to decide this issue. Some
courts1 1 4 as well as commentators"1 5 deny the existence of such a
power, while other courts""' and commentators 17 are willing to permit
it, at least to a certain extent.1 8
In international arbitration it would be unwise to consider the ar-
112 See, e.g., the following cases involving international trade: Interocean Shipping
Co. v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 462 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1972), affd on
other grounds, 523 F. 2d 527 (2d Cir. 1975); Pollux Marine Agencies, Inc. v. Louis
Dreyfus Corp., 455 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
118 See Interocean Shipping, 462 F. 2d at 676; Pollux Marine, 455 F. Supp. at
216-17.
114 See, e.g., Judgment of May 5, 1977, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 68 BHGZ
356, 358, 365-66.
115 K. SCHWAB, supra note 36, at 39; Schwab, supra note 107, at 21-25; Gloss-
ner, supra note 107, at 66.
118 See Judgment of Nov. 1, 1957, Oberlandesgericht, Celle, 1958 Monatsschrift
fUr Deutsches Recht 172.
117 See, e.g., H. MAIER, supra note 111, at 80.
118 As to the very confusing state of German law on this issue, see the detailed and
critical article of Mann, Schiedsrichter und Recht, 1 FESTSCHRIFT FOR WERNER
FLUME ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 593, 608 (H. Jakobs ed. 1978).
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bitral tribunal, in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary,
as destitute of all power to decide upon its own jurisdiction. It seems,
instead, much more expedient to consider it as invested with such
power in certain situations, for instance, in all cases where the claimant
has originally introduced his request not before the competent local
court, but before the arbitral tribunal.
In such cases, the reasons which generally induce the parties to an
international contract to submit their eventual disputes to arbitration119
demand that the arbitral tribunal itself decide upon its proper jurisdic-
tion, even if the parties have not expressly empowered it to do so. Oth-
erwise, the case would have to be moved to the competent state court,
resulting in loss of time and money. Undesirable forum-shopping might
ensue and a period of uncertainty would govern the dispute of the par-
ties. No one would know whether the litigation would finally remain
before the state court or whether it would have to be removed again to
the arbitral tribunal. In the event a second (and final) removal back to
the arbitral tribunal would have to be made, that tribunal would again
have to read the files, consider the case, and perhaps weigh the same
evidence and raise the same legal issues as the state court had already
done. In view of these circumstances, it would certainly be proper to
presume that the parties wanted to have the arbitral tribunal entrusted
with the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, if the claimant had, in
the first instance, introduced his claim before the arbitral tribunal and
.not before the competent state court.
For the same reasons, the opposite solution would apply if the
claimant had filed his claim first with the competent state court. It
would be appropriate in such a case to consider that court as entrusted
with the power to decide whether it would have jurisdiction to deal
with the subject matter or whether the parties had, by a valid arbitra-
tion agreement, referred the subject matter to an arbitral tribunal.
3. THE SUBSTANTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT
After U.S. and West German enterprises agree to refer their po-
tential disputes to an arbitral tribunal, they then must determine which
method is best-suited to implement the arbitration agreement. Many
questions will arise in this respect. Should the parties submit their
"I These reasons include: greater knowledge of arbitrators about sophisticated in-
ternational commercial matters; confidentiality of the proceedings; better command of
foreign languages by arbitrators, which dispenses with the need for furnishing transla-
tions and employing interpreters; other economies of expense; the relative speed of arbi-
tration proceedings.
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eventual disputes to an institutional arbitration court or to an ad hoc
tribunal? If an institutional arbitration would seem to be most advanta-
geous, which would be best-suited to handle such a dispute? Since the
choice of an institutional arbitration court is in some respects interre-
lated with the place of the arbitration and the proper law of the con-
tract, further problems of the choice of place of arbitration and the
proper law of the contract will arise. Even if the parties agree upon an
institutional arbitration, for example, upon the jurisdiction of the Court
of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, this
might not preclude them from choosing a special seat for their arbitral
proceedings in a city other than that in which the institution's head-
quarters are located. The parties might even be tempted to agree upon
a "delocalized" arbitration: should such an agreement be recommended
or should the parties be warned against embarking upon such an ad-
venture? A great many other questions might be raised by the parties,
but those mentioned above are the most important, and thus will be
analyzed separately below.
3.1. The Choice of an Institutional Arbitration Court
Many reasons suggest that U.S. and West German enterprises
should, instead of conferring jurisdiction upon an ad hoc tribunal, re-
sort to an institutional arbitration for dealing with their future dis-
putes. Above all, arbitration institutions normally supply parties with a
highly desirable organizational framework 2° which, with ad hoc arbi-
tration, would have to be arranged by the parties themselves.
If institutional arbitration can generally be recommended to the
parties, the question remains which institution would best be suited for
an arbitration between a U.S. and a West German enterprise. It fol-
lows from the nature of such a dispute that the parties should not resort
to any of their national arbitration institutions. They should rather en-
trust a "neutral" arbitration institution with jurisdiction, one sitting in
a country which has friendly ties with both home countries of the par-
ties. About a half dozen institutions seem acceptable in this respect.121
120 The framework takes care of, for example: the proper filing of the request for
arbitration and its answer; the appointment and challenge of the arbitrators; the han-
dling of the deposit for the costs of the proceedings; the issuance and deposit of an
eventual award, its notification to the parties, its enforcement, etc. See generally 2 J.
WETTER, supra note 109, at 257-368 (compares the organizational rules of five inter-
national arbitration institutions).
121 For a general discussion of sites, see AMERICAN ARB. AW5'N, SURVEY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SITES (1984); see also Branson & Tupman, Selecting an
Arbitral Forum: A Guide to Cost -Effective International Arbitration 24 VA. J. INT'L
L. 917, 919-20 (1984) (discussing the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in
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3.2. The Choice of the Place of Arbitration
It has been stressed already that the choice of an arbitral institu-
tion does not necessarily prevent the parties from agreeing upon a place
of arbitration which is different from the seat of that institution. The
primary examples are those arbitration proceedings that are organized
under the auspices of the ICC Court of Arbitration in Paris which
actually has its seat in a country other than France, most often
Switzerland.
1 22
Furthermore, some commentators,'123 arbitral tribunals, 124 and
Paris); Stein & Wotman, International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980's: A
Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules, 38 Bus. LAW. 1685, 1685-86
(1983) (discussing ICC in Paris, and London Court of Arbitration (LCA)).
For commentary focusing on specific sites, see, e.g., (1) London Court of Interna-
tional Arbitration: 2 HANDBUCH DER INTERNATIONALEN VERTRAGSGESTALTUNG
1099-1117 (0. Sandrock ed. 1980); Lord Hacking, Where We Are Now: Trends and
Developments Since the Arbitration Act (1979), 2 J. INT'L ARB. No. 4, at 7 (1985);
Jarvin, London as a Place for International Arbitration, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 59, 64-71
(1984); Kerr, International Arbitration v. Litigation, 1980 J. Bus. L. 164; Paulson, A
Commentary on the 1985 Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration, 10
Y.B. COM. ARB. 167 (1985); Schlosser, Probleme der Internationalen Handelsschied-
sgerichtsbarkeit, 24 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 237, 242-43 (1979). (2) Court of Arbi-
tration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris: 2 J. WETTER, supra note
109, at 145; Bucher, Allgemeine Einfiihrung in die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der
Schweiz, in DIE INTERNATIONALE SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER SCHWEIZ 1, 2-3
(1979) (Switzerland as place of arbitration for ICC Court); de Hancock, supra note 5,
at 22; Eisemann, The Revised Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce, 1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 167 (1976). (3) The Court of Arbitration of the Zurich
Chamber of Commerce: Bachmann, Switzerland: The Court of Arbitration of the Zu-
rich Chamber of Commerce, in HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE 203 (E. Cohn, M. Domke & F. Eiseman eds. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as HANDBOOK]; Briner, National Report: Switzerland, 3 Y.B. COM. ARB. 181
(1978); Endlich, Anerkennung und Vollstreckbarkeit von Schiedssprilchen und die
Schiedsordnungen auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene, 1979 DER BETRIEB
2472; Karrer, Arbitration Procedure in Switzerland: Zurich and Geneva Compared,
2 IrN'L CONT. 49 (1981). (4) The Arbitral Center of the Austrian Federal Economic
Chamber at Vienna: W. MELIS, A GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN Aus-
TRIA (1983); Melis, Austria: The Arbitral Centre of the Federal Economic Chamber,
in HANDBOOK, supra, at 33. (5) The Netherlands Arbitration Institute: Sanders, Na-
tional Report: The Netherlands, 6 Y.B. COM. ARB. 60 (1981); van Marwijk Kooy,
The Netherlands: The Netherlands Arbitration Institute, in HANDBOOK, supra, at
133; Rules (1979) of the Netherlands Arbitration Institute, Rotterdam, 7 Y.B. COM.
ARB. 228 (1982). (6) The Stockholm Arbitration Institute: 2 J. WETTER, supra note
109, at 231-33; Hjerner, Sweden: The Stockholm Arbitration Institute, in HANDBOOK,
supra, at 187; Sweden: Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce, 7 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 68 (1982); Sweden: Rules of the Arbitration Institute of
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 3 Y.B. COM. ARB. 254 (1978).
12 See, e.g., Bucher, supra note 121, at 2-3.
121 See, e.g., R. DAVID, Arbitration in International Trade 281-82 (1985); P.
FOUCHARD, 2 L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 316 (1965); Goldman,
Les Conflits de lois dans l'arbitrage international de droit privg, 2 RECUEIL DES
COURS DE L'ACADPMIE DE LA HAYE 347, 380 (1963); Lalive, Les r~gles de conflit de
lois appliquges au fond de litige par l'arbitre international si~geant en Suisse, 1976
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state courts 125 believe that the choice of an institutional arbitration does
not preclude the parties from selecting no particular geographical place
for their arbitration proceedings. Under this view, such parties are free
to authorize their arbitral tribunal to act on a transnational level with-
out being bound by any procedural rules of the actual place of arbitra-
tion. The arbitral tribunal is thereby empowered to render its award on
the basis of the general principles of procedural law which derive from
justice and equity and which are recognized by all civilized nations.
This doctrine of the so-called "delocalized" award126 was first applied
in the famous Gotaverken award which was rendered in 1978 by an
arbitral tribunal acting under the auspices of the Court of Arbitration
in Paris; 127 since then it has been widely propounded by its adherents,
while being (partly) followed1 28 or (partly) rejected 12 ' by others. If this
doctrine were acceptable, one might be tempted to recommend to the
REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 155, 159 (1976).
124 For example, see the award rendered by an arbitral tribunal acting under the
auspices of the ICC Arbitration Court in Paris on April 5th, 1978 in Gotaverken A.B.
v. Libyan Gen. Nat. Maritime Transp. Co., reprinted in 2 J. WETTER, supra note
109, at 178-230; see also award rendered by P. Lalive "as the sole arbitrator" ap-
pointed by the ICC on January 14, 1970, in the matter of an Indian cement company
and a Pakistani bank arbitrated in Geneva, Switzerland. 5 Y.B. Com. ARB. 170, 171,
174 (1980).
'25 Judgment of Feb. 21, 1980, Cour d'appel, Paris (Libyan Gen. Nat'l Maritime
Transp. Co. v. Gotaverken Arendal), reported in 107 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL [J.D.I.] 660 (1980), translated in Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award De-
tached from the Law of its Country of Origin, 30 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 385 (1981)
[hereinafter Arbitration Unbound]; Judgment of Aug. 13, 1979, Svea Hovratt (Su-
preme Court), Swed. (Gotaverken Arendal A.B. v. Libyan Gen. Maritime Transp.
Co.), translated in Paulsson, The Role of Swedish Courts in Transnational Commer-
cial Arbitration, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 244 (1980-81) [hereinafter Role of Swedish
Courts]. For commentary on these decisions, see Paulsson, Arbitre et jugg en Suede:
Exposg g~nral et r~flexions sur la dlocalisation des sentences arbitrales, 1980 RE-
VUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 441, 473-84; Role of Swedish Courts, supra; see also Mezger, 69
REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVIE (R.C.D.I.P) 770 (1980) (critical
annotation to decision of Court of Appeal of Paris).
128 See Arbitration Unbound, supra note 125, at 358.
1" See 2 J. WETTER, supra note 109, at 170.
128 See, e.g., Ferrante, About the nature (national or a-national, contractual or
jurisdictional) of ICC awards under the New York Convention, in THE ART OF ARBI-
TRATION: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 129 (J. Schultz & A. van den
Berg eds. 1982); Hunter, Comment, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, RE-
PORT OF THE 60TH CONFERENCE HELD AT MONTREAL IN 1982, at 295 (1983); Paul-
sson, Arbitration Unbound, supra note 125, at 363-64; Jeantet, Annotation to the
decision of the Court of Appeal of Paris, 1980 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 533, 536.
129 For a thorough critique of this doctrine, see Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 157 (P.
Sanders ed. 1967); Mann, England Rejects "Delocalized" Contracts and Arbitration,
33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 193 (1984) [hereinafter Delocalized Contracts]; see also A.
VAN DEN BERG, supra note 24, at 28-43; 2 J. WETTER, supra note 109, at 171-78;
Mezger, Comment, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE
60TH CONFERENCE HELD AT MONTREAL IN 1982, at 282 (1983).
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parties of a U.S.-West German arbitration agreement the following
wording of their agreement:
All disputes arising out of or relating to the present con-
tract shall be finally settled by arbitration to be held in...
[insert the factual place of arbitration] . . . in accordance
with the Rules of the ... [insert the arbitration rules of the
institution chosen by the parties] . . ., but in detachment
from the local procedural rules in effect at the place of
arbitration.
The consequences, however, deriving from such detachment from
the country where the arbitration takes place, are astounding. The local
procedural rules in effect at the place of arbitration, even the most co-
gent ones, have no bearing at all on the arbitral proceedings or on the
award to be rendered.' 30 No appeal lies against the award under those
rules,13 1 the award being exclusively based upon the arbitration agree-
ment of the parties which removes it from a local level onto a transna-
tional level and serves as its only foundation. Hence, the choice of the
place of arbitration would be of minor, if not of trifling, importance.' 32
The award would only have to meet the requirements set up by the
laws of the respective countries where its enforcement would afterwards
be sought.
133
A question arises, however, whether such a doctrine stands up to
scrutiny on both theoretical and practical levels. Theoretically, one
might wonder whether arbitration proceedings might be carried on and
whether awards, once rendered, might be binding entirely outside the
realm of any national sovereign just on the basis of a nudum pactum of
the parties. National laws derive their binding force from the wills of
their respective national sovereigns. The same is true for judgments
rendered by national courts of any nation. The obligatory force of in-
ternational law stems from the international community of nations
which has developed a set of binding rules called the law of nations.
International judgments derive their binding force from the submissions
of the parties to such jurisdiction. It is hardly feasible that the judge of
a private international arbitral tribunal may sit between the national
130 See 2 J. WETTER, supra note 109, at 209-13 (for award rendered by the
arbitral tribunal in Gotaverken).
131 See Judgment of Feb. 21, 1980, Cour d'appel, Paris, translated in Paulsson,
Arbitration Unbound, supra note 125, at 385-87.
132 Cf Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound, supra note 125, at 358 ("marginal
importance").
133 See Judgment of Aug. 13, 1979, Svea Hovratt, Swed., translated in Paulsson,
Role of Swedish Courts, supra note 125, at 248.
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level of the respective states and the international level of the commu-
nity of nations, rendering awards that are binding upon the parties to
the arbitration, wholly without the authority of any national sovereign,
solely on the basis of a presumed autonomy of such parties to contract
out of the realm of their national sovereigns on an international level
unfettered by their national laws or the rules of the law of nations.
On the practical level, other objections may be raised against the
doctrine of delocalization. First, it is not clear whether an appeal could
be launched against a "delocalized" award. If such an award would be
manifestly deficient (for example, for want of a valid arbitration agree-
ment or on the ground of the cooperation of a biased arbitrator), the
need for the possibility of a review of the award before a controlling
state court would be obvious. The advocates of the doctrine of the "de-
localized" award have some difficulties, however, in finding a "natu-
ral"'" judicial authority before which such challenge might be brought.
Second, the problems which the theory of the "delocalized" award
would create for the application of the New York Convention must not
be forgotten. According to article V, paragraph (1) lit.(e) of the New
York Convention, recognition and enforcement of the award may be
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, for
example, if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that the award "has been
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in
which, or under the law of which, that award was made. 1' 5 Similarly,
article VI of the New York Convention provides that the authority
before which the award is sought to be relied upon may adjourn the
decision on the enforcement of the award and may also order the party
seeking the enforcement of the award to give to the other party suitable
security, if an application for the setting aside or suspension of the
award has been made pursuant to the aforementioned article V, para-
graph 1 lit.(e).186
The New York Convention thus seems to be based upon the as-
sumption that there is always a "country" by the authority of whose
laws an award has been made and that the respondent against which
enforcement of such an award is sought should have the option of chal-
lenging the award before the courts of that "country" to the extent that
the law of that country provides for such challenge. Again, ifthere is
no "country" by the authority of whose laws an award has been made,
134 This term was used in Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound, supra note 125, at
370.
3L5 A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 24, at 399.
'Be Id.
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the "delocalized" award could not be challenged at all before a court of
the place in which it has been rendered. One requirement upon which
the enforcement procedures of the New York Convention have been
based,13 7 would thus not have been met.138 It seems doubtful, therefore,
whether enforcement of a "delocalized" award could be sought at all
under the New York Convention. 9 Without being able to secure rec-
ognition and enforcement under the New York Convention, such an
award is of little practical value.Thus, even though the doctrine of the
"delocalized" award has been accepted by the Court of Appeal of Paris
and the Supreme Court of Sweden,' 40 U.S. and West German enter-
prises would be remiss to ignore the recognition and enforcement
problems in U.S., West German, and other national courts. As A. J.
van den Berg recently remarked in his thorough study of the New York
Convention, " . . . the insufficient legal basis and the absence of recog-
nition by most national courts make the agreement for 'denationalized'
arbitration a hazardous undertaking full of legal pitfalls.' ' 41
3.3. The Choice of the Proper Law of Contract
U.S. and West German enterprises should also be warned against
stipulating in the arbitration agreement that the contract, to which such
agreement would be attached, should be governed by the lex mercatoria
or by any other set of ill-defined rules which, as their advocates believe,
can be derived from international trade and commerce and which form
no part of any local law at all, but also belong, in the language of Lord
117 See Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound, supra note 125, at 371-72; Hunter,
supra note 128, at 296; Mezger, supra note 129, at 238.
138 For a detailed analysis, see A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 24 (showing that a
"delocalized" award has to be refused enforcement under the New York Convention).
139 It has been argued, however, that if the parties to an arbitration agreement
have agreed to comply with an eventual "delocalized" award as finally binding and
enforceable, they would have waived their right to any form of appeal. In such a case,
no challenge could therefore be brought by the parties before a court of the country by
the authority of which, or under the law of which, the award would have been made.
Consequently, enforcement of such "delocalized" award could be sought under the New
York Convention. See Judgment of Aug. 13, 1979, Svea Hovratt, Swed., translated in
Paulsson, Role of Swedish Courts, supra note 125, at 246; Arbitration Unbound,
supra note 125, at 372. If that argument were accepted, no challenge whatsoever would
lie against any award rendered by an arbitral tribunal acting under the Rules for the
ICC Court of Arbitration. Article 24 of those Rules provides that "[bly submitting the
dispute to arbitration by the International Chamber of Commerce, the parties shall be
deemed to have undertaken to carry out the resulting award without delay and to have
waived their right to any form of appeal insofar as such waiver can validly be made."
Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, 1
Y.B. CoM. ARB. 164 (1976). This would, after all, be an astounding consequence.
140 See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
141 See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 24, at 33.
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Judge Kerr, to the "transnational firmament." 42
It is not the place here to discuss this very controversial theory
1"3
which seems to have gained a certain influence in international arbitra-
tion, to the extent that arbitration agreements nowadays sometimes ex-
pressly refer to it and that the use of such clauses is recommended by a
number of legal scholars, arbitrators, and other practitioners. Its short-
comings have been demonstrated amply.1 44 Except for a few areas
where merchants have developed some rather clear-cut commercial
rules to govern their respective relations (for example, the Incoterms
and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits),
there is no set of definite rules which could be derived from interna-
tional customs, international equity, or principles of law common to all
or most nations, giving clear guidance on how to solve, in a foreseeable
and predictable manner, the intricate questions of law arising in inter-
national trade.
In cases in which arbitral tribunals are referred to leges mer-
catoriae or, in the absence of an agreement between the parties on the
proper law, apply that doctrine on their own initiative, the tribunals
are without clear guidance from any national law. Instead, they must
develop vague notions about what, under the particular circumstances
of the case, international merchants would have held just and equitable,
having regard to the solutions developed in systems of law related to the
142 Bank Mellat v. Helleniki Techniki S.A., [1983] 3 W.L.R. 783, 789.
143 For English-speaking authorities on this theory, see J. LEW, APPLICABLE
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1978); Croff, The Applicable
Law in an International Commercial Arbitration, 1982 INT'L LAW. 613, 623, 634;
Lando, The "Lex Mercatoria" in International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 741 passim (1985). For French-speaking authorities, see R. DAVID,
L'ARBITRAGE DANS LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 479 (1982); P. FOUCHARD, supra
note 123, at 401; Goldman, La lex mercatoria dans les contrats et l'arbitrage interna-
tionaux: rkalitbs et perspectives, 104 J.D.I. 339 (1977); Lalive, Probl~mes relatifs a
l'arbitrage international commercial 1 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE 569, 650 (1967). For German-speaking authori-
ties, see E. LANGEN, TRANSNATIONALE RECHT (1981); Martiny, in 7 MONCHENER
KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESTZBUCH 529, 539 (H. Sonnenberger ed. 1983);
Schmitthoff, Das neue Recht des Welthandels, 28 R.Z.A.I.P. 47 (1964); see also Sand-
rock & Steinschulte, in 1 HANDBUCH DER INTERNATIONALE VERTRAGSGESTALTUNG
99 (0. Sandrock ed. 1980) (critical survey of German-speaking advocates of the
theory).
144 See, e.g., Mann, in 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 193, 196 (1984). The discussion
points to problems in the recent decision of the English House of Lords in Amin
Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Ins. Co., [19831 2 All E.R. 884. Lord Diplock held
that "contracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum," and that they "are mere
pieces of paper devoid of all legal effect unless they were made by reference to some
system of private law. . . ... Id. at 891. Yet Lord Wilberforce retorted that "this argu-
ment. . . can be disposed of by describing it as contending for an internationlised, or
floating, contract unattached to any system of law: to do so does not do it justice." Id. at
895.
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particular case or in other prominent national laws wholly unrelated
thereto. The borderline between arbitrations subject to the rule of law
and arbitrations ex aequo et bono would be blurred. Predictability
would be lost. No longer would anyone be able to assess, in approxi-
mate sums of money, the risks involved in the introduction of arbitra-
tion proceedings. In the long run, it would even have to be feared that
the reputation of international arbitration would suffer.
In view of these disadvantages, the choice of the lex mercatoria as
the proper law of contract cannot be recommended. Instead, in deter-
mining the governing law of the contract, the parties to a U.S.-West
German arbitration agreement should consider the national systems of
law mentioned in the section above on commendable places of arbitra-
tion. English, French, Swiss, Austrian, Dutch, and Swedish law might
be considered as candidates for assuming such a function. For obvious
reasons, it would be most convenient if the place of arbitration (which
usually has an impact upon the procedural rules to be applied by the
arbitral tribunal) would coincide with the proper law of the contract.
Contradictions between the substantive and procedural rules could thus
be avoided.
4. THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
4.1. The General Policy Underlying the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958
4.1.1. United States
In interpreting the New York Convention, U.S. courts have evi-
denced a pro-arbitration leaning. For example, in Parsons & Whitte-
more Overseas Co. v. Socigtg G~n~rale de l'Industrie du Papier
(RAKTA), 1 5 the court construed narrowly the Convention's public pol-
icy defense in order to ensure the enforcement of an arbitral award.
Specifically, the court held:
In equating 'national' policy with United States 'public'
policy, the appellant quite plainly misses the mark. To read
the public policy defense as a parochial device protective of
national political interests would seriously undermine the
Convention's utility. This provision was not meant to en-
shrine the vagaries of international politics under the rubric
of 'public policy'. Rather, a circumscribed public policy doc-
trine was contemplated by the Convention's framers and
145 508 F. 2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
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every indication is that the United States, in acceding to the
Convention, meant to subscribe to this supranational empha-
sis .... 146
In refusing to expand the public policy defense, the court took a
pro-arbitration stance which has since been adopted and expanded in
many other decisions.147 The liberal spirit transpiring from these deci-
sions has been welcomed, if not praised, by many commentators in the
United States 14 8 as well as abroad.
1 49
4.1.2. Federal Republic of Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany, apart from a regrettable inter-
val between 1933 and 1945, has been receptive to international arbitra-
tion.' 50 It was one of the first countries to ratify the New York Conven-
tion in 1961.51 As well, unlike the United States, the Federal Republic
of Germany is a member of the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Agree-
ments and the Geneva Convention on the Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards. In 1965, it acceded to the European Convention on
Commercial Arbitration.
Thus, there has been no change of policy towards international
commercial arbitration in the Federal Republic of Germany in recent
146 See id. at 973, 974.
147 Almost all decisions following Parsons & Whittemore which had to deal with
the defenses enacted in article V of the Convention refer to this judgment as the basis
for their construction of article V of the Convention. See Bergeson v. Joseph Muller
Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 930-32 (2d Cir. 1983); Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184,
187 (1st Cir. 1982); see also supra notes 123-25.
148 See, e.g., Harnik, supra note 23, at 703, 704; Aksen, supra note 23, at 342,
351; see also von Mehren, supra note 23, at 349, 361.
149 See A. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 24, at 359, 366; Delaume, supra note 24,
at 788, 807; Sanders, supra note 24, at 271; Schlosser, supra note 24, at 456.
150 See section 1044 of the West German Code of Civil Procedure, which lists
only four exclusive grounds upon which a West German court may refuse recognition
and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award: (1) the nullity or unenforceability of the
award pursuant to the national law by which the proceedings before the arbitral tribu-
nal were governed; (2) the violation of German public policy; (3) a lack of due process
insofar as a party has not been duly represented in the arbitration proceedings; and (4)
a lack of due process insofar as a party has not had a due chance to exercise its right to
be heard, and, in particular, to expound its factual and legal arguments before the
arbitral tribunal. ZPO § 1044 (W. Ger.). If none of these grounds can be proved to
exist by the party opposing the enforcement, the German court must enforce the foreign
award even though it may be persuaded that, i.e., either the procedural rules which
governed the arbitral proceedings were seriously violated, though short of nullity or
unenforceability of the award, or that the arbitral tribunal might not correctly have
applied the substantive law governing the underlying contract.
151 See id. § 1044 (W. Ger.) (the author has paraphrased the statute). For the list
of member states and their dates of accession, see Kornmeier & Sandrock, supra note
36, 1070-72.
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decades. No sweeping statements like those found in the Scherk 152 and
Mitsubishi 153 decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court or in the Parsons
& Whittemore'54 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit may be detected in West German judgments or legal writings.
West German commentators merely assert that it was the intention of
the drafters of the New York Convention to facilitate the enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards vis-a-vis the Geneva Convention of 1927 by
no longer requiring the exequatur of the state where the award had
been rendered and by shifting the burden of proof with regard to any
defense against the enforcement, upon the shoulders of the party raising
such defenses and legal arguments.1 55 If none of these grounds can be
proven to exist by the party opposing the enforcement, the West Ger-
man court must enforce the foreign award, even though it may be per-
suaded that either the procedural rules which have governed the arbi-
tral proceedings may have been seriously (but short of nullity or
unenforceability of the award) violated, or that the arbitral tribunal
might not have correctly applied the substantive law governing the un-
derlying contract."5 '
4.2. The Interpretation of Some of the Defenses Embodied in the New
York Convention
The liberal spirit governing the interpretation of the New York
Convention both in the United States and in the Federal Republic of
Germany becomes apparent if one looks into the cases decided by the
courts of the two countries dealing with the different defenses listed in
article V of the Convention.
1 57
Due to the limited scope of this article, only a few of the defenses
will be discussed here. Emphasis is placed upon those defenses which
are most likely to be raised in U.S.-West German arbitration cases.
4.2.1. The Defense of the Invalidity of the Arbitration Agreement
A previous section of this paper 15 dealt with the substantive re-
15 See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
15 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974); see also supra notes 145-47 and accompanying
text.
"55 See, e.g., the very meager remarks by K. SCHWAB, supra note 36, at 417.
156 See supra note 150.
157 The volume of international arbitrations handled in New York City is much
larger than in Hamburg or any other locations in the Federal Republic of Germany.
This may explain why the U.S. case law dealing with the New York Convention is
much richer than West German case law.
158 See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
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quirements to be met by an arbitration agreement in order to be recog-
nized as valid and enforceable under article II of the New York Con-
vention. According to article V, paragraph (1) lit.(a) of the Convention,
recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused if it is proven
by the party opposing the recognition and enforcement of the award
that the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the
parties have subjected it, or, failing any indication thereon, under the
law of the country where the award was made.
159
It should be noted in this context that in a decision of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York160 (where the
arbitral tribunal had been sitting), a charter-party between an Italian
and a Bahamian company with an arbitration clause attached to it was
held valid even though the charter-party purportedly contained an Is-
raeli boycott clause which contravened the public policy of the United
States and the State of New York, where enforcement of the arbitration
agreement was sought. The court referred to the Scherk.6' and Parsons
& Whittemore'62 decisions in holding that, though the "national pol-
icy" of the United States might have been contravened by the arbitra-
tion agreement being connected to the boycott clause, U.S. "public pol-
icy" under the particular circumstances of the case 63 had not
fundamentally been jeopardized.""
A similar solution might be obtained under West German common
law, when the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is at stake. Ac-
cording to the West German common law of procedure, the validity
and enforceability of the arbitration agreement is no longer a require-
ment for the enforcement of a foreign award, once the foreign award
has become final in its country of origin. A foreign award is considered
to be final when it can no longer be challenged before the courts of the
state or under the national laws by which the arbitral proceedings have
been governed.1 65 Thus, in both legal systems, there is a perceivable
trend in certain situations to isolate international arbitrations from cer-
tain vices resulting from the nullity or unenforceability of arbitration
agreements, thereby promoting rather than hampering international
'5 Art. V, para. (1) lit.(a), 21 U.S.T. at 2523, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S.
at 40.
160 Antco Shipping Ltd. v. Sidermar S.P.A., 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
11 See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
16 The carriage of the goods provided for in the charter-party, did not touch U.S.
territory.'Antco, 417 F.Supp. at 216.
16 See id. at 216, 217; see also von Mehren, supra note 23, at 358 (article V
defenses are construed very narrowly).
1" This results from section 1044 of the West German Code of Civil Procedure.
ZPO § 1044; see supra note 150.
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arbitration.
4.2.2. The Defense of Inadequate Opportunity to Present One's Case
According to article V, paragraph (1) lit.(b) of the New York
Convention, recognition and enforcement of a foreign award may be
refused if the party against whom the award is invoked was not given
proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present his case.1 6 Thus, it
has been held that, "[tihis provision essentially sanctions the application
of the forum state's standards of due process.1167 Again, U.S. courts
have very narrowly construed this part of the New York Convention, 88
whereas West German courts twice refused recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral awards rendered in the United States in accordance
with the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). 6 '
The decisions of the West German courts suggest that West Ger-
man law interprets the defenses embodied in article V of the New York
Convention rather extensively; however, this appearance is mistaken. It
is merely accidental that these two cases, clearly falling under the pub-
lic policy defense of West German law, have come up before West Ger-
man courts. The general trend in the Federal Republic of Germany
favors a narrow interpretation of article V of the Convention. Two de-
cisions rendered by the German Supreme Court in Civil Matters when
only the rules of the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation of 1954 were in effect, and before the United States' acces-
sion to the New York Convention conspicuously support this conclu-
sion.170 In both cases recognition and enforcement were granted.
M" Art. V, para. (1) lit. (b), 21 U.S.T. at 2523, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S.
at 40.
167 See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci& G~nrale de
L'industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974).
165 See von Mehren, supra note 23, at 358-59, citing Laminoirs-Trefileries-
Cableries de Lens v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063, 1067 (N.D. Ga. 1980), and
Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegerifte GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument
Co., 415 F. Supp. 133, 139-40 (D.N.J. 1976). It is true that these two decisions were
based on article V (2)(b) of the Convention; however, in Southwire the court declined to
vacate an award over the objection that the party who raised it was refused the oppor-
tunity to fully cross-examine the other party's witness. In Medford the refusal of the
U.S. to participate in the hearings was held immaterial since that party received notice
of the arbitral proceedings.
169 See Judgment of June 10, 1976, Oberlandesgericht, reprinted in 4 Y.B. COM.
AR. 258 (1979); Judgment of April 3, 1975, Oberlandesgericht, W. Ger., reprinted in
2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 241 (1977).
170 Judgment of Oct. 21, 1971, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 86 ZEITSCHRIFT
FUER ZIVILPROZESS [Z.Z.] 46 (1973); Judgment of Feb. 16, 1961, Bundesgerichtshof,
W. Ger., 34 Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 274. As to the importance of
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, see U. DROBNIG, supra note 11;
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4.2.3. The Defense of Limited Jurisdictional Scope
This defense, arising under article V, paragraph (1) lit.(c) of the
New York Convention, is that the award deals with a difference not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms" of the submission to
arbitration, or that it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration. The seminal decision of Parsons &
Whittemore17 1 stated that this defense should be construed narrowly,
like the others already discussed, and that, once again, such a narrow
construction would comport with the Convention's emphasis on facili-
tating enforcement of arbitration proceedings.
17
1
4.2.4. The Defense of Improper Constitution of the Arbitral
Tribunal
In Imperial Ethiopian Gov't v. Baruch-Foster Corp.,1 7 - a U.S.
company raised the defense that since the arbitral tribunal was improp-
erly constituted, the damage award it rendered was unenforceable. Spe-
cifically, the U.S. company claimed that due to the third arbitrator's
longstanding ties with the Imperial Government of Ethiopia, he could
not make neutral decisions.'1 4 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit rejected the claim that the arbitral tribunal was improperly
constituted. The court's holding presumed the arbitrator could exercise
independent judgment since he was "a most respected man and a man
of honor and of absolute integrity.' u 5 As well, the court referred to the
Convention's purpose of encouraging the recognition and enforcement
of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and
unifying the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed
and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.1
7 6
Domke, American Arbitral Awards: Enforcement in Foreign Countries, 1965 U. ILL.
L.F. 399, 406 (1965).
171 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). A narrow-construction was applied to the de-
fense also by Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, 571 F. Supp 948, 959, 960
(S.D. Ohio 1981). See also von Mehren, supra note 23, at 359-60 (citing Andros Com-
pania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1978)). Andros
was based on 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1982) which authorizes vacating an award "(w)here
the arbitrators exceeded their powers". The court added, however, that the same result
would be obtained under the New York Convention. 579 F.2d at 703 n.16.
172 508 F.2d at 976 (West German decisions dealing with this provision of the
New York Convention could not be found).
173 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1976).
174 See id. at 337. The third arbitrator was Professor Ren6 David of Paris Uni-
versity. From 1954 to 1958, he drafted the new Ethiopian Civil Code. During this
time, he received compensation for his work from the Ethiopian government, the suc-
cessful claimant in the proceedings. Id.
175 Id.
178 See id. at 335 (drawing upon the Scherk decision); see also International
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Unlike the U.S. and other countries,117 the Federal Republic of
Germany strictly supervises the independence of arbitrators. For in-
stance, in 1970 the West German Supreme Court in Civil Matters ren-
dered its own well-known decision17 8 by which the following procedure
for the appointment of arbitrators was declared unlawful due to its vio-
lation of West German public policy. The parties to an arbitration
agreement had stipulated that an eventual dispute arising between them
should be decided by an arbitral tribunal composed of two members,
each of which should be appointed by one of the parties; however, if
one party should fail to appoint an arbitrator, then the arbitrator ap-
pointed by the other party should be entitled to act as sole arbitrator
and to render the award alone without the cooperation of a second
arbitrator.
17 9
The Court held such a procedure unlawful and in violation of
West German public policy.180 It reasoned that since an arbitral tribu-
nal is vested with jurisdictional powers, its members must be indepen-
dent of and impartial to the parties. Even the appearance of depen-
dence or partiality, which would arise from the dominant position of
one of the parties with respect to the appointment of the arbitrators,
was held impermissible by the Court.18 '
Prod., Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017
(1981) (refusing to vacate an award under 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1976) which authorizes
such action vacating, i.e., "(w)here there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them"); Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc
Rich & Co., 480 F. Supp. 352, 357-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (award confirmed and appli-
cation of article V (2)(b) of the New York Convention denied notwithstanding the
objection of the respondent that one of the arbitrators had not been wholly independent
from one of the parties). See Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc. 517 F.
Supp 948, 953-55 (S.D. Ohio 1981); von Mehren, supra note 23, at 360.
177 For example, in England, by virtue of section 7 of the English Arbitration Act
of 1950, if one party fails to appoint an arbitrator then the other party "who has
appointed an arbitrator may appoint that arbitrator to act as sole arbitrator. . . and his
award shall be binding on both parties, as if he had been appointed by coisent." En-
glish Arbitration Act of 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, 37.
178 Judgment of Nov. 5, 1970, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger. 24 N.J.W. I 139
(1971).
179 Id.
'10 Id. The majority of West German legal writers concur with the Supreme
Court. See Schlosser, supra note 31, annot. III n.17 to § 1032; K. ScHWAB, supra note
36, at 61; Adlerstein, Zur Unabhingigkeit des Schiedsrichters, in STUmDIN ZUM
RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKErr 19, 34 (K. Boeckstiegel &
B. Boerner eds. 1979). As to the law prior to the decision of the German Supreme
Court, see U. KORNBLUM, PROBLEME DER SCHIEDSRICHTERLICHEN
UNABHXNGIGKEIT 204 passim (1968); E. Heymann, Der ordre public in der privaten
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 68 passim (1969); Habscheid, Das Problem der Unabhangigkeit
der Schiedsgerichte 15 N.J.W. 5, 8-9 (1962).
181 Judgment of Nov. 5, 1970, supra note 178, at 139. This ruling comes dose to
the ruling stated by the United States Supreme Court in Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150, (1968): ". . .any tribunal per-
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The Supreme Court added that when a remedy was sought for the
failure of a party to cooperate in the appointment of the arbitral tribu-
nal, recourse should be had either to the competent court or to a third,
independent authority for the appointment of a substitute arbitrator.
1
1
2
4.2.5. The Defense of Violation of Public Policy
The liberal interpretation given in Parsons & Whittemore88 to
the general policy underlying the New York Convention has been di-
rectly applied to the public policy defense found in article V, paragraph
(2) lit.(b) of the Convention. In Fotochrome Inc. v. Copal Co.,184 an
arbitral award had been rendered between a Japanese and a U.S. com-
pany by an arbitral tribunal sitting in Japan, in favor of the Japanese
claimant. When the latter party petitioned for the recognition and en-
forcement of the award in the United States, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit granted the petition even though the U.S. defendant
had filed a petition for an arrangement under chapter XI of the Bank-
ruptcy Act before the award had been issued. The court referred to the
Scherk and Parsons & Whittemore decisions in repeating that "the
public policy in favor of international arbitration is strong."185 Hence,
the public policy limitation of the New York Convention "is to be con-
strued narrowly" and could "be applied only where enforcement would
violate the forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice."
' .8
At least one decision, however, has been rendered where article V,
paragraph (2) lit.(b) was applied so that recognition and enforcement
of the award of a foreign arbitral tribunal was refused. In Laminoirs-
mitted by law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also must
avoid even the appearance of bias." Id. This ruling has, however, been considerably
narrowed by later decisions following the landmark policy of Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Soci6t6 Gfnrale de L'industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969
(2d Cir. 1974): Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948,
953-55 (S.D. Ohio 1981); see also cases cited in note 184 infra.
1s Judgment of Nov. 5, 1970, supra note 178, at 139-40.
s 508 F. 2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
154 517 F. 2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975); see supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text;
see also Waterside Ocean Nay. Co. v. International Nav. Ltd., 737 F. 2d 150, 152 (2d
Cir. 1984); Andros Compania Maritima S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F. 2d 691, 699,
703 nn.11, 16 (2d Cir. 1978); La Soci6t6 Nationale pour la Recherche, la Production,
le Transport, la Transformation et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures v.
Shaheen Natural Resources Co., 585 F. Supp. 57, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 733 F.
2d 260 (2d Cir. 1984); Fertilizer Corp., 517 F. Supp. at 955; Transmarine Seaways
Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc Rich & Co., 480 F. Supp. 352, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument
Co., 415 F. Supp. 133, 139-40 (D.N.J. 1976).
181 Fotochrome, 517 F.2d at 516; see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 516-20 (1985); Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 974.
1" 517 F. 2d at 516.
[Vol. 9:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol9/iss1/2
U.S.-WEST GERMAN ARBITRATION
Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co.,1817 it appeared
that an award had been rendered by an arbitral tribunal in favor of a
French claimant company against a U.S. respondent for the payment of
certain interests. The arbitral tribunal which had issued the award had
been proceeding in accordance with the Rules for Arbitration of the
ICC in Paris. The U.S. respondent moved to vacate the award because
the arbitral tribunal had, inter alia, applied the French rate of interest
according to which the rate assessed should rise five percent per annum
after two months from the date of the award to rates of 14.5 percent
and 15 percent. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia concluded that the imposition of the additional five percent in-
terest in accordance with the French statute had been punitive rather
than compensatory, and that it bore no reasonable relation to any dam-
age resulting from delay in recovery of the sums awarded.18s The court,
therefore, held that, pursuant to article V, paragraph (2) lit.(b) of the
New York Convention, the public policy of Georgia precluded recogni-
tion and enforcement of the award.""
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Court of Appeals of
Hamburg '190 refused to recognize or enforce an arbitral award rendered
in the United States, based on a public policy defense raised by the
German respondent who allegedly had not had a proper chance to pre-
sent his case. Recognition and enforcement were barred pursuant to
article V, paragraph (1) lit.(b) of the New York Convention. 91 In that
context, the Court of Appeals stated that not every infringement of
mandatory provisions of West German law would have to be regarded
as a violation of West German public policy, but that such a violation
could occur in extreme cases. 192 This distinction between "ordinary"
mandatory provisions and such provisions which, on account of their
"extremely" important role in the promotion of justice, bring into play
West German "public policy concerns," thus seems to create a signifi-
cant condition to enforcement of arbitration decisions, about which U.S.
and West German enterprises should exercise care. In that respect, the
condition resembles the distinction between mere "national policy," on
the one hand, and the "public policy" comprising "the forum state's
most basic notions of morality and justice," on the other, introduced by
the Parsons & Whittemore decision of the Court of Appeals for the
l 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
'" Id. at 1069.
189 See id.
190 See Judgment of Mar. 27, 1975, supra note 169, at 240.
191 Id.
192 Id.
1987]
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5. CONCLUSION
International private arbitration is the most effective and indispen-
sable tool of solving disputes in international business transactions. The
technical mechanisms of this legal institution have been greatly im-
proved, both on the international and national levels in recent decades.
What is more important, the general spirit in which this tool has been
handled in recent years has become increasingly liberal and open-
minded, both in the United States and in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. Many problems remain to be solved in the framework of U.S.-
West German commercial arbitration.19 ' But there is much hope that
the proper solutions can be created through the same liberal spirit that
has prevailed in the last years.
193 See Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F. 2d at 974.
1 As an example, many problems result from the role of states as parties to
international arbitration proceedings when such states raise the defense of sovereign
immunity.
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